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I. Introduction

In recent years, images of United States police wearing
helmets and masks, carrying military-style weapons, and riding in
armored or even mine-resistant armored vehicles have become
increasingly prevalent with media depictions of responses to civil
disorder and a purported nationwide trend of police
militarization. 1 At the same time, the Department of Defense
(DOD) and the White House have released some of the federal
government’s most significant policy guidance ever prescribing
and proscribing defense support to civilian authorities, reflecting
over two centuries of past military engagement with civil
authorities, responses to present emergencies and disasters, and
future anticipated political, fiscal, and security realities. 2
Specifically, DOD Instruction 3025.21 “Defense Support of Civilian
Law Enforcement Agencies,” was issued on February 27, 2013,
supplementing DOD Directive (DODD) Number 3025.18, Defense
Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA). 3 It replaced several older
DOD issuances 4 on military assistance to civilian law enforcement
1. See Police Militarization, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/issues/criminallaw-reform/reforming-police-practices/police-militarization
(describing
the
nationwide trend of police militarization) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
2. Portions of the following have been adapted from U.S. MILITARY
OPERATIONS: LAW, POLICY, AND PRACTICE 797–829 (Geoffrey S. Corn et al. eds.,
2015).
3. See DEP’T OF DEF. INSTR. 3025.21, DEF. SUPPORT OF CIVILIAN L. ENF’T
AGENCIES (Feb. 27, 2013), https://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf
/302521p.pdf (establishing DOD policy and replacing DoDDs 3025.12, 5525.5, and
5030.46), published in 78 Fed. Reg. 71 (Apr. 12, 2013) (to be codified at 32 CFR
§ 182), http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/2013/04/dsclea.pdf. It is important to note
that Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 3025.18 is also still in effect. See
DEP’T OF DEF. DIRECTIVE 3025.18, DEF. SUPPORT OF CIV. AUTH. (DSCA) (Dec. 29,
2010), http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/ pdf/302518p.pdf (incorporating
and canceling DOD Directive 3025.1 and 3025.15 (references a and b)).
4. See, e.g., What are the DoD Issuances, WASH. HEADQUARTERS SERV’S.,
http://biotech.law.lsu.edu/blaw/dodd/general.html (“A [DOD Instruction] is a DoD
issuance that implements the policy, or prescribes the manner or a specific plan
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and civil disturbances, and affects the way in which Active and
Reserve Component forces implement nearly fifty-year-old civil
disturbance contingency plans in the Twenty-First Century.
Months after the disastrous effects of the October 2012 Superstorm
Sandy, 5 and weeks prior to the devastating April 15, 2013 Boston
Marathon bombings, 6 the May 20, 2013 El Reno tornado in
Oklahoma, 7 and the summer 2013 wildfires in both Arizona 8 and
Colorado, 9 the DOD issued an instruction clarifying the rules for
the involvement of military forces in civilian law enforcement. The
instruction establishes DOD policy, assigns responsibilities, and
provides procedures for DOD support to Federal, State, tribal, and
local civilian law enforcement agencies, including responses to civil
disturbances within the United States.
The defense support instruction requires that senior DOD
officials develop “procedures and issue appropriate direction as
necessary for defense support of civilian law enforcement agencies
in coordination with the General Counsel of the Department of
of action for carrying out the policy. . . . A Regulation is a document of general
application designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe procedural
requirements”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and
Social Justice).
5. See, e.g., Superstorm Sandy: Before, During and Beyond, NAT’L PUB.
RADIO,
http://www.npr.org/series/164212970/full-coverage-superstorm-sandy
(providing news coverage on Superstorm Sandy) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
6. See, e.g., Boston Marathon Terror Attack Fast Facts, CNN (Apr. 8, 2016,
7:18 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/06/03/us/boston-marathon-terror-attackfast-facts (reporting on the Boston Marathon bombings) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
7. See, e.g., Kendis Gibson, Oklahoma Tornado 2013: Death toll rises to 18,
WJLA (June 3, 2013), http://www.wjla.com/articles/2013/06/oklahoma-tornado2013-death-toll-rises-to-12-89611.html (reporting on the death toll from the
Oklahoma Tornado) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights
and Social Justice).
8. See, e.g., Report: Arizona Wildfire Grew Quickly, Was Erratic, CBS 5 /
KHPO (Jul. 15, 2013, 10:28 PM), http://www.cbs5az.com/story/22848108/reportarizona-wildfire-grew-quickly-was-erratic?autostart=true (reporting on the
Arizona wildfires in 2013) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil
Rights and Social Justice).
9. See, e.g., Saddie Gurman, Ryan Parker & Joey Brunch, Colorado
Wildfires Consume Homes, Force Evacuations, DENV. POST, (June 11, 2013, 3:29
PM), http://www.denverpost.com/2013/06/11/colorado-fires-consume-homes-forceevacuations (reporting on the Colorado wildfires in 2013) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
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Defense, and in consultation with the Attorney General of the
United States,” including “tasking the DOD Components to plan
for and to commit DOD resources in response to requests from civil
authorities for [civil disturbance operations].” 10 Military officials
are to coordinate with “civilian law enforcement agencies on
policies to further DOD cooperation with civilian law enforcement
agencies” and the heads of the combatant commands are
instructed to issue procedures for “establishing local contact points
in subordinate commands for purposes of coordination with
Federal, State, tribal, and local civilian law enforcement
officials.” 11 This is especially important in the realm of so-called
complex catastrophes that would overwhelm local and state
agencies individually and require federal agency involvement with
the DOD supporting an overall effort. 12
Also in February 2013, Deputy Secretary of Defense Ashton
Carter issued a memorandum to define complex catastrophe as:
Any natural or man-made incident, including cyberspace
attack, power grid failure, and terrorism, which results in
cascading failures of multiple, interdependent, critical, lifesustaining infrastructure sectors and causes extraordinary
levels of mass casualties, damage, or disruption severely
affecting the population, environment, economy, public health,
national morale, response efforts, and/or government
functions. 13

10. See DEP’T OF DEF. INSTR. 3025.21, supra note 3, at 10 (describing the
responsibilities for the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and
Americas’ Security Affairs).
11. See id. at 12 (describing the responsibilities for the Heads of the DOD
Components).
12. See Christopher DeHart, Army North Hosts Northern Command
Complex Catastrophe Session, U.S. N. COMMAND (June 6, 2013),
http://www.northcom.mil/Newsroom/Article/563636/army-north-hosts-northerncommand-complex-catastrophe-session (quoting Major Chris Byrd, civil support
planner with the Army North Operations Section, “Cooperation and coordination
become vital components to successfully dealing with a complex catastrophe
situation”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social
Justice).
13. See Memorandum from Deputy Sec’y of Def., Dep’t of Def., to Sec’ys of
the Military Dep’ts et al. (Feb. 19, 2013), https://wss.apan.org/2530/
Staff%20Sections/DSCA/Complex%20Catastrophe%20Definition.pdf
(establishing
the DOD definition of “complex catastrophe.”).
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This was especially significant to enable the DOD to “assess a
broader range of forces, defense installations assets, and other
DOD capabilities that could aid in response to complex
catastrophes,” 14 as well as align DOD efforts with the 2011
Presidential Policy Directive 8, “National Preparedness,” 15 and
other key sources of policy and strategic guidance, and prioritize
strategy, policy and planning, and preparedness.
At nearly the same time, DOD issued its Strategy for
Homeland Defense and Defense Support of Civil Authorities to
address the range of “current and emerging threats to the
homeland and natural and manmade hazards inside the United
States for the period 2012-2020 [ . . . ] in keeping with current
fiscal realities.” 16
14. See id. (explaining the significance of the DOD definition of “complex
catastrophe.”).
15. See Presidential Policy Directive 8: National Preparedness, HOMELAND
SEC. (Mar. 30, 2011), https://www.dhs.gov/presidential-policy-directive-8national-preparedness (“Presidential Policy Directive / PPD-8 is aimed at
strengthening the security and resilience of the United States through systematic
preparation for the threats that pose the greatest risk to the security of the nation,
including acts of terrorism, cyberattacks, pandemics, and catastrophic natural
disasters”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social
Justice). In this PPD, the President:
[D]irect[ed] the development of a national preparedness goal that
identifies the core capabilities necessary for preparedness and a
national preparedness system to guide activities that will enable the
Nation to achieve the goal. The system will allow the Nation to track
the progress of our ability to build and improve the capabilities
necessary to prevent, protect against, mitigate the effects of, respond
to, and recover from those threats that pose the greatest risk to the
security of the Nation.
The Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and
Counterterrorism shall coordinate the interagency development of an
implementation plan for completing the national preparedness goal
and national preparedness system. The implementation plan shall be
submitted to me within 60 days from the date of this directive, and
shall assign departmental responsibilities and delivery timelines for
the development of the national planning frameworks and associated
interagency operational plans described below.
Id.
16. See Leon E. Panetta, Forward to U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., STRATEGY FOR
HOMELAND DEF. & DEF. SUPPORT OF CIV. AUTH.’S (Feb. 2013),
https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=732192 (elaborating on the priorities for the core
DOD missions) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and
Social Justice).
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Part II of this chapter overviews the historic laws and policies
that are the foundations for defense support to civilian authorities,
particularly in the context of support to law enforcement agencies
and the prevention of or response to civil disorders. This sets the
stage for a non-exhaustive historical assessment in Part III of 20th
and 21st century examples of defense support to civil authorities,
broken down into the eras of: the early to mid-20th Century; mid
to late-20th Century; the late 1970s through early 1990s: and the
so-called “Garden Plot” civil disturbance plan being revisited in
real-world application; and the early 2000s through 2010s, putting
the Federal Government’s National Response Plan (NRP) (later
called National Response Framework–NRF) to test in
contemporary operations under policies extant at the time of this
chapter’s writing and under the limitations of the 2015 Executive
Order directing better coordinated Federal support for state, local
and tribal law enforcement equipment acquisition. This will set the
stage for the way ahead described in Part IV, considering the
current framework for future national response to disasters and
emergencies.
II. Historic Laws as the Foundations for Defense Support
Defense support of civil authorities policy changes must be
read in light of an evolution, rather than revolution, involving over
a century of federal troop deployments and 200-plus years of legal
precedent, starting with the United States Constitution. Article I,
Section 8 is the wellspring from which military to support civil
authorities draws sustenance. Specifically, “Congress shall have
power . . . to provide for calling forth the Militia to execute laws of
the Union, suppress Insurrections, and repel Invasions.” 17 In
conjunction with this Congressional authority, each President
“shall take care that the Laws be faithfully executed” consistent
with Article II, Section 3. 18 Read in conjunction with those
provisions, the basis for Federal government support, including
DOD assistance, to State and local authorities arises under the
Tenth Amendment, inasmuch as “The powers not delegated to the
17.
18.

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
Id. at art. I, § 3.

DEFENSE SUPPORT OF CIVIL AUTHORITIES

95

United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it, are
reserved to the States respectively.” 19
President George Washington found need to issue a
proclamation in 1794 summoning 13,000 federalized militia
troops, led by Treasury Secretary Alexander Hamilton and
Virginia governor Henry Lee, to march into western Pennsylvania
to act against the Whiskey Rebellion over excise taxes in
Pennsylvania. Subsequent legislation empowered the president to
use regular military forces as well, and laws passed during the
Civil War and Reconstruction periods further strengthened the
executive’s use of federal troops, as well as setting forth limitations
on its use. 20
The Insurrection Act of 1807 was one of the first and most
important United States laws still in force on this subject, and was
followed some 71 years later by the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878,
which continues to limit executive authority to conduct military
law enforcement on United States soil. Each of those and other
civil support laws has evolved over time—consistent with the times
and the popular will expressed through Congress.
The Insurrection Act, (codified, as amended, at 10 USC § 331–
335) has changed from its 1807 inception many times, with most
notable alterations in the mid-twentieth century. This succinct law
has consistently exempted federal (and federalized troops) from
legal prohibitions on employment and deployment on US soil in the
following instances:
19. Id. at amend. X § 3.
20. Presidential emergency power was established in six statutes in 1792,
1795, 1807, 1871, and 1878: Calling Forth Act of 1792, ch. 28, 1 Stat. 264 (repealed
1795); the Militia Act of 1795, ch. 36, 1 Stat. 424 (repealed in part 1861 and
current version at 10 U.S.C. §§ 331–35 (2013)); the Insurrection Act of 1807, ch.
39, 2 Stat. 443 (current version at 10 U.S.C. §§ 331–35 (2013)); the Suppression
of the Rebellion Act of 1861, ch. 25, 12 Stat. 281 (current version at 10 U.S.C.
§§ 331–35 (2013)); specific parts of the Ku Klux Klan (Civil Rights) Act of 1871,
ch. 22, §§ 3–4, 17 Stat. 13, 14–15 (expired in part 1873 and current version at 10
U.S.C. § 333), and; the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 (current version at 18 USC
§ 1385 (2013). See, e.g., Stephen I. Vladeck, Note, Emergency Power and the
Militia Acts, 114 YALE L.J. 149 (2004) (discussing the first five statutes). See also
PAUL J. SCHEIPS, THE ROLE OF FEDERAL MILITARY FORCES IN DOMESTIC DISORDERS,
1945-1992, 449–52 (2005), http://www.history.army. mil/html/books/030/3020/cmh_pub_30-20.pdf. Troop presence in the South for supposedly partisan
political ends led to the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878, “restoring an earlier
national consensus that military intervention in civil affairs should occur only
when specifically authorized in the law.” Id.
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§ 331. Federal aid for State governments
Whenever there is an insurrection (sic) in any State against its
government, the President may, upon the request of its
legislature or of its governor if the legislature cannot be
convened, call into Federal service such of the militia of the
other States, in the number requested by that State, and use
such of the armed forces, as he considers necessary to suppress
the insurrection.
§ 332. Use of militia and armed forces to enforce Federal
authority
Whenever the President considers that unlawful obstructions,
combinations, or assemblages, or rebellion against the
authority of the United States, make it impracticable to enforce
the laws of the United States in any State or Territory by the
ordinary course of judicial proceedings, he may call into Federal
service such of the militia of any State, and use such of the
armed forces, as he considers necessary to enforce those laws or
to suppress the rebellion.
§ 333. Interference with State and Federal law
The President, by using the militia or the armed forces, or both,
or by any other means, shall take such measures as he considers
necessary to suppress, in a State, any insurrection, domestic
violence, unlawful combination, or conspiracy, if it—
(1) so hinders the execution of the laws of that State, and of the
United States within the State, that any part or class of its
people is deprived of a right, privilege, immunity, or protection
named in the Constitution and secured by law, and the
constituted authorities of that State are unable, fail, or refuse
to protect that right, privilege, or immunity, or to give that
protection; or
(2) opposes or obstructs the execution of the laws of the United
States or impedes the course of justice under those laws.
In any situation covered by clause (1), the State shall be
considered to have denied the equal protection of the laws
secured by the Constitution.
§ 334. Proclamation to disperse
Whenever the President considers it necessary to use the
militia or the armed forces under this chapter, he shall, by
proclamation, immediately order the insurgents to disperse and
retire peaceably to their abodes within a limited time.
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§ 335. Guam and Virgin Islands included as “State”
For purposes of this chapter, the term “State” includes the
unincorporated territories of Guam and the Virgin Islands. 21

For a brief year, the Insurrection Act was expanded under the
2007 John M. Warner Defense Authorization Act, then brought
back to longstanding language in the subsequent fiscal year. 22 In
21. 10 U.S.C. §§ 331–335 (2012); see also John R. Brinkerhoff, The Role of
Federal Military Forces in Domestic Law Enforcement, JOINT CTR. FOR
OPERATIONAL ANALYSIS J. (2004), http://www.narlo.org/posse%20comitatus.pdf
(analyzing the Insurrection Act for the President’s authority to authorize federal
troops to enforce the law). Brinkerhoff explained:
Title 10, Section 331 was enacted in 1792 in response to challenges to
the taxing power of the federal government. It allows the President, at
the request of a governor or state legislature, to put down an
insurrection by calling into federal service sufficient militia to
“suppress the insurrection.”
Title 10, Section 332 was enacted in 1861 at the outset of the Civil War.
It allows the President to use the armed forces to enforce the laws or
suppress a rebellion whenever, in his opinion, unlawful obstructions,
combinations, or assemblages or rebellion against the authority of the
United States make it impractical to enforce the laws using the course
of judicial proceedings.
Title 10, Section 333 was enacted in 1869 during the Reconstruction
Era. It allows the President to use the armed forces or militia to
respond to insurrection, domestic violence, unlawful combination, or
conspiracies that prevent a state government from enforcing the laws.
Title 10, Section 334 was enacted in 1861. It prescribes that the
President shall issue a proclamation calling on insurgents to disperse
before using the militia or armed forces to enforce the law.
Id.
22. On September 30, 2006, the Congress modified the Insurrection Act as
part of the 2007 Defense Authorization Bill (repealed as of 2008). The so-called
“Insurrection Act Rider,” Section 1076 of the law, changed Section 333 of the
Insurrection Act, and widened the President’s ability to deploy troops within the
United States to enforce the laws. Under this act, the President could also deploy
troops as a police force during a natural disaster, epidemic, serious public health
emergency, terrorist attack, or other condition, when the President determines
that the authorities of the state are incapable of maintaining public order. The
bill also modified Section 334 of the Insurrection Act, giving the President
authority to order the dispersal of either insurgents or “those obstructing the
enforcement of the laws.” The law changed the name of the chapter from
“Insurrection” to “Enforcement of the Laws to Restore Public Order.” The 2008
Defense Authorization Bill, repealed the changes made in the 2007 bill. See, e.g.,
Kevin H. Govern, “Making Martial Law Easier” in the U.S, 1 HOMELAND SEC. REV.
221, 221–30 (2007) (finding that the re-examination of domestic employment and
deployment of military forces did not make marital law easier).
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2011, President Obama signed the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2012 into law, in which Section 1031, clause “b,”
article 2 defines a “covered person,” i.e., someone possibly subject
to detention, as the following:
A person who was a part of or substantially supported al-Qaeda,
the Taliban, or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities
against the United States or its coalition partners, including
any person who has committed a belligerent act or has directly
supported such hostilities in aid of such enemy forces. 23

The so-called Posse Comitatus Act (codified, as amended, at 18
U.S.C. § 1385) uses a Latin term found in sixteenth-century
English law meaning “to have the right to an armed retinue.” 24 The
Posse Comitatus Act passed on June 18, 1878, prohibiting federal
troops from supervising Confederate state elections in the latter
portion of the Reconstruction Era. 25 It originally applied only to the
US Army, but was amended after the US Air Force was created to
include those forces in 1956, then has applied by DOD regulation
to include US Navy and US Marine Corps forces as well. The Posse
Comitatus Act reads now, as follows:
Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly
authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses
any part of the Army or the Air Force as a posse comitatus or
otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined under this title or
imprisoned not more than two years, or both. 26

Further, 6 U.S.C. § 466 is an unusual codification of a “sense of
Congress reaffirming the continued importance and applicability
of the Posse Comitatus Act,” in particular the following subsections providing for exceptions and exemptions:
(4) Nevertheless, by its express terms, the Posse Comitatus Act
is not a complete barrier to the use of the Armed Forces for a
23. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No.
112-81, § 1031 (b)(2), 125 Stat. 1298, 1562 (2011).
24. Charles Holloway, Posse Comitatus, CHARLES HOLLOWAY (July 4, 2012),
http://www.charlesholloway.co.uk/2012/07/posse-comitatus/ (on file with the
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
25. Kevin Govern, Lawful Military Support To Civil Authorities In Times of
Crisis, JURIST, (May 2, 2013, 12:30 PM), http://jurist.org/forum/2013/05/kevingovern-posse-comitatus.php (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil
Rights and Social Justice).
26. 18 U.S.C § 1385 (2012).
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range of domestic purposes, including law enforcement
functions, when the use of the Armed Forces is authorized by
Act of Congress or the President determines that the use of the
Armed Forces is required to fulfill the President’s obligations
under the Constitution to respond promptly in time of war,
insurrection, or other serious emergency.
(5) Existing laws, including chapter 15 of Title 10 (commonly
known as the “Insurrection Act”), and the Robert T. Stafford
Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. 5121
et seq.), grant the President broad powers that may be invoked
in the event of domestic emergencies, including an attack
against the Nation using weapons of mass destruction, and
these laws specifically authorize the President to use the Armed
Forces to help restore public order. 27

The Posse Comitatus Act has prohibited troops under federal
authority (that is Title 10 Active Component troops and
"federalized" Title 32 National Guard troops) from generally
conducting law enforcement duties on United States soil absent
congressionally legislated or constitutionally enumerated
authority or exception. By comparison and contrast, The Reserve
components of the Armed Forces are: The Army National Guard of
the United States, The Army Reserve, The Navy Reserve, The
Marine Corps Reserve, The Air National Guard of the United
States, The Air Force Reserve, and The Coast Guard Reserve (10
U.S.C. § 10101). 28 Federal troops use exceptions to the
Insurrection Act and Posse Comitatus Act would be intelligence,
military equipment, training, advice or facilities usage, amongst
other matters in support of civilian law enforcement under 10
U.S.C. § 381, 29 or troop employment and deployment during a

27. 6 U.S.C. § 466 (2012).
28. 10 U.S.C. § 10101 (2012); see also John H. Ebbighausen, Unity of
Command for Homeland Security: Title 32, Title 10, or a Combination, DEF. TECH.
INFO. CTR (2006),
http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA451789
(explaining history of the National Guard) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice); see also NCC Staff, An Important
Landmark Anniversary for the National Guard, NAT’L CONST. CTR. (June 3,
2016),
http://blog.constitutioncenter.org/2016/06/an-important-landmarkanniversaryfor-the-national-guard/ (citing with authority The National Defense
Act, Pub.L. 64–85, 39 Stat. 166, enacted June 3, 1916) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
29. 18 U.S.C. § 381 (2012).
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biological, radiological, or nuclear event under 18 U.S.C. § 382. 30
Also, § 1004 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 1991, as amended, 31
allowed the Secretary of Defense to provide support for the
counterdrug activities of any other department or agency of the
federal government or of any state, local, or foreign law
enforcement agency if certain criteria, set out in the statute
[were] met. 32

Under that authority, in September 2011, the GAO reported
$1.35 billion in costs for DOD support to the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) in two separate counternarcotics border
operations in four border states—Operation Jump Start and
Operation Phalanx—conducted by National Guard forces in Title
32 status from June 2006 to July 2008 and from June 2010 through
September 30, 2011, respectively. 33 The GAO further noted that
between 1989 and 2011, the DOD “estimate[d] the cost of using
active duty Title 10 forces nationwide in support of drug law
enforcement agencies (with additional operational costs borne by
the military services) at about $10 million annually.” 34
The 1988 Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency
Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. §§ 5121-5207) authorizes the President
to release federal funds and assistance to states for use in disaster
response and declare an emergency or major disaster at the
request of a state (or US territory) governor, as well as the mayor
of Washington, D.C. 35 What the Stafford Act does not authorize is
the use of the military to perform law enforcement functions
ordinarily prohibited by the Posse Comitatus Act.
The Heritage Foundation has assessed that “[a]fter the
passage of the Stafford Act in 1988, the number of declared federal
disasters dramatically changed, steadily rising from an average of
30. 18 U.S.C. § 382 (2012).
31. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991, H.R. Res. 4739,
101st Cong. (1990) (enacted).
32. Davi M. D’Agostino, Observations on the Costs and Benefits of an
Increased Department of Defense Role in Helping to Secure the Southwest Land
Border, GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 1, 8 (2011), http://www.gao.gov/assets/
100/97733.pdf.
33. Id. at 3.
34. Id.
35. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121–5207 (2012)
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28 per year under President Ronald Reagan, to an average of 130
per year under Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama.” 36
An “emergency” under the Stafford Act is “any occasion or instance
for which . . . Federal assistance is needed to supplement State
and local efforts and capabilities . . . or to lessen or avert the threat
of a catastrophe.”37 A “major disaster” is defined as “any natural
catastrophe (including any hurricane, tornado, storm, high water,
wind-driven water, tidal wave, tsunami, earthquake, volcanic
eruption, landslide, mudslide, snowstorm, or drought), or,
regardless of cause, any fire, flood, or explosion.” 38
Upon the request of the governor, the President may task the
DOD to provide any emergency work the President deems
essential for the preservation of life and property in the immediate
aftermath up to ten days prior to a presidential declaration of an
emergency or major disaster. 39 Emergency work can include the
clearance and removal of debris and wreckage and the restoration
of essential public facilities and services. 40
The declaration of an emergency under the Stafford Act
requires that the governor of the affected state first make a
determination that the situation is of such severity and magnitude
that the state is unable to respond effectively without federal
assistance, which determination must include a detailed definition
of the type and amount of federal aid required, except where the
President determines that a disaster implicates preeminently
federal interests. 41
Finally, DOD policy under color of the Stafford Act allows
commanders to provide immediate response in the guise of
resources and assistance to civil authorities prior to, or in the
36. David Inserra, Top 5 Priorities for Homeland Security in 2016, HERITAGE
FOUND. (Jan. 11, 2016), http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/ 2016/01/top-5priorities-for-homeland-security-in-2016 (on file with the Washington and Lee
Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
37. 42 U.S.C. § 5122(1) (2012).
38. Id. § 5122(2).
39. Id. § 5170b; see also Jennifer Elsea & R. Chuck Mason, The Use of
Federal Troops for Disaster Assistance: Legal Issues, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. 1, 4–
5 (2008), http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RS22266.pdf (summarizing the
possible constitutional and statutory authorities allowing the use of federal troops
to assist States in handling a natural disaster).
40. Id. at 4.
41. 42 U.S.C. § 5191 (2012).
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absence of a declaration if disaster overwhelms the capabilities of
local authorities and necessitates immediate action “to save lives,
prevent human suffering, or mitigate great property damage
within the United States” but “does not permit actions that would
subject civilians to the use of military power that is regulatory,
prescriptive, or compulsory.” 42
Aside from the Stafford Act basis for support, Section 1208 of
the 1990 National Defense Authorization Act 43 has allowed the
Secretary of Defense to transfer to Federal and State agencies
personal property of the Department of Defense, including small
arms and ammunition, that the Secretary determines is:
(A) suitable for use by such agencies in counter-drug activities; and
(B) excess to the needs of the Department of Defense. 44 In 1996,
Congress replaced Section 1208 with Section 1033, 45 which
subsequently became 10 U.S.C. § 2576a. 46
The Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) notes that “[s]ince its
inception, the 1033 program has transferred more than $5.1 billion
worth of property. In 2013 alone, $449,309,003.71 worth of
property was transferred to law enforcement.” 47 As part of its
outreach to civilian agencies, the DLA predicted that ”[i]f your law
enforcement agency chooses to participate, it may become one of
the more than 8,000 participating agencies to increase its
42. DEF. SUPPORT OF CIVILIAN L. ENF’T AGENCIES, supra note 3, at § 4g; see
also Elsea & Mason, supra note 39, at 5 (citing Jim Winthorp, The Oklahoma City
Bombing: Immediate Response Authority and Other Military Assistance to Civil
Authority (MACA), ARMY LAWYER 3–15, (1997)).
43. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991, Pub.
L. No. 101-189, 103 Stat. 1352 (1989).
44. See id. (adding that the Secretary shall carry out this section in
consultation with the Attorney General and the Director of National Drug Control
Policy in accordance with § 1208(1)(3)); see also 10 U.S.C. § 2576a(b) (2012)
(noting that the Secretary of Defense may transfer personal property under
[Section 2576a] only if six express conditions are met).
45. See Taylor Wofford, How America’s Police Became an Army: The 1033
Program, NEWSWEEK (Aug. 13, 2014, 10:47 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/howamericas-police-became-army-1033-program-264537 (“[T]he 101st Congress in
1990 enacted the National Defense Authorization Act. . . . It was called 1208
Program. In 1996, Congress replaced Section 1208 with Section 1033”) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
46. 10 U.S.C. § 2576a (2012).
47. Kevin H. Govern, Defense Support of Civil Authorities to Natural and
Man-Made Disasters, in U.S. MILITARY OPERATIONS: LAW, POLICY, AND PRACTICE
806 (Geoffrey S. Corn et al. eds., 2016).
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capabilities, expand its patrol coverage, reduce response times,
and save the American taxpayer’s investment.” 48 Critics of the
program, such as the ACLU, claimed “a disturbing range of
military gear [is] being transferred to civilian police departments
nationwide” and alleged “one-third of all war materiel parceled
out to state, local, and tribal police agencies is brand new.” 49
As “one of the five armed forces within the US and the only
military organization within the [DHS],” the US Coast Guard
(USCG), under 14 U.S.C. §§ 1–894, is the “[N]ation’s leading
maritime law enforcement agency” with “broad, multi-faceted
jurisdictional authority” limited neither by the Insurrection Act
nor by the Posse Comitatus Act. 50 However, under 14 U.S.C. § 3
as amended by section 211 of the Coast Guard and Maritime
Transportation Act of 2006, 51 the USCG operates as a service in
the Department of the Navy upon the declaration of war and
when Congress so directs in the declaration, or when the
President so directs. 52
President George W. Bush signed The Homeland Security
Act of 2002 53 into law on November 25, 2002, 54 creating the DHS
48. Id.
49. Matthew Harwood, To Terrify and Occupy, ACLU (Aug. 14, 2014, 9:59
https://www.aclu.org/blog/criminal-law-reform-free-speech/terrify-andAM),
occupy (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social
Justice); see generally War Comes Home: The Excessive Militarization of American
Policing,
ACLU
(June,
2014),
https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/
assets/jus14-warcomeshome-report-web-rel1.pdf.
50. Office of Law Enforcement (CG-MLE): Mission, Office of Law
Enforcement (CG-MLE), U.S. COAST GUARD, http://www.uscg.mil/hq/cg5/cg531/
(last modified June 12, 2013) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of
Civil Rights and Social Justice); see generally 14 U.S.C. §§ 1–894 (2012).
51. Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Act of 2006, 14 U.S.C. §§ 1–
894 (2012).
52. See 14 U.S.C. § 3(b) (2012) (“Upon the declaration of war if Congress so
directs in the declaration or when the President directs, the Coast Guard shall
operate as a service in the Navy, and shall so continue until the President, by
Executive order, transfers the Coast Guard back to the Department of Homeland
COAST
GUARD,
Security.”);
see
also
Missions,
U.S.
https://www.uscg.mil/top/missions/ (last updated Mar. 20, 2014) (“Upon the
declaration of war or when the President directs, the Coast Guard operates under
the authority of the Department of the Navy”) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
53. Homeland Security Act of 2002, 6 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
54. Office of the Press Secretary, President Bush Signs Homeland Security
Act, WHITE HOUSE: PRESIDENT GEORGE W. BUSH (Nov. 25, 2002),
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as an organization to “lead the unified national effort to secure
America, . . . prevent and deter terrorist attacks and protect
against and respond to threats and hazards to the
Nation, . . . ensure safe and secure borders, welcome lawful
immigrants and visitors, and promote the free-flow of commerce.” 55
Empowering DHS to take a “nationwide approach for Federal,
State, and local governments to work effectively and efficiently
together to prepare for, respond to, and recover from domestic
incidents, regardless of cause, size, or complexity,” 56 President
Bush then issued Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5
(HSPD-5), assigning the responsibility of developing a National
Incident Management System (NIMS) to the DHS secretary,
including a mandate for an NRP (later called NRF). The following
four HSPD-5 criteria define when the DHS shall assume overall
Federal incident management coordination responsibilities:
(1) A Federal department or agency acting under its own
authority has requested DHS assistance,
(2) The resources of State and local authorities
overwhelmed and Federal assistance has been requested,

are

(3) More than one Federal department or agency has become
substantially involved in responding to the incident, or
(4) The Secretary has been directed by the President to assume
incident management responsibilities. 57

The NRP authorized “immediate action to save lives, prevent
human suffering, or mitigate property damage,” and a preapproved authority under in extremis “Immediate Response”
conditions. 58 The DOD considers imminently serious conditions
https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/11/200211256.html (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social
Justice).
55. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., SECURING OUR HOMELAND: U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF HOMELAND SECURITY STRATEGIC PLAN 4 (2004), https://www.hsdl.org/?view&
did=712147 (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and
Social Justice).
56. Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-5—Management of
Domestic Incidents, U.S. GOV’T PUB. OFF. 229, 231 (Feb. 28, 2003),
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-2003-book1/pdf/PPP-2003-book1-doc-pg229. pdf.
57. Id. at 230.
58. The Department of Defense (DOD) Role in Incident Response: Staff
Officer’s Handbook, CTR. FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED, 46 (May 2006),
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resulting from any civil emergency where time does not permit
approval from higher headquarters. 59 In these situations:
[L]ocal military commanders and responsible officials from
DOD components and agencies are authorized by DOD directive
and pre-approval by the Secretary of Defense, subject to any
supplemental direction that may be provided by their DOD
component, to take necessary action to respond to requests of
civil authorities consistent with the Posse Comitatus Act (18
U.S.C. § 1385). 60

III. 20th and 21st Century Examples of Defense Support to Civil
Authorities
In recent United States history, there have been many
instances and exemptions whereby federal (or federalized) troops
were called upon to conduct brief operations to promote or restore
law and order, other than training, on United States soil in
accordance with an Executive Order or Proclamation under the
Insurrection Act or some other exemption to the Posse Comitatus
Act. The most salient of these examples will be discussed below.
A. Early to Mid-20th Century
In 1919, President Woodrow Wilson called out Federal troops
to quell race riots in twenty cities across the United States, which
commenced first in Chicago, ostensibly arising from postwar social
tensions related to demobilizing World War I veterans and
competition for jobs among ethnicities. 61 In 1932, President
Herbert Hoover called upon General Douglas MacArthur, with the
http://usacac.army.mil/sites/default/files/publications/06-08.pdf.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. See Peter Perl, In The Race Riot of 1919, a Glimpse of Struggles to Come,
WASH. POST (Mar. 1, 1999), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/
politics/1999/03/01/in-the-race-riot-of-1919-a-glimpse-of-struggles-to-come/ad846
6e-283e-4584-bd71-3b7810dbca07/ (“The Washington riot was one of more than
20 that took place that summer. With rioting in Chicago, Omaha, Knoxville,
Tenn., Charleston, S.C., and other cities. . . . President Wilson mobilized about
2,000 troops to stop the rioting”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of
Civil Rights and Social Justice).
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aid of his staff officers Majors George Patton and Dwight D.
Eisenhower, to send US troops to displace and disperse a group of
20,000 aggrieved WWI veterans (the so-called "Bonus Marchers")
encamped on or near the Washington Mall; this infamous incident
involved the first instance of MacArthur ignoring presidential
directive, when he pursued veterans and families across the
Anacostia River despite Hoover’s orders to stand down. 62
On Labor Day in 1934, textile workers in the northeast and
southeastern US began a strike against their treatment by
employers at the mills. 63 In response to the strike, Georgia
Governor Eugene Talmadge declared martial law, and arrested
strikers who continued their protests. 64 The first arrests, including
many women workers, were from the Sargent and East Newnan
Cotton Mills; carried out by bayonet-armed Georgia National
Guardsmen, the strikers were transported by military trucks to
Fort McPherson in Atlanta:
[W]here the workers were incarcerated in outdoor holding cells
formerly occupied by German prisoners of war during World
War I. Those arrested were held there until the strike ended
three weeks later, after the United Textile Workers (UTW)
union received government assurances that the problems at
southern textile mills would be investigated. 65

During 1946, President Harry S. Truman sent out federal troops
against 800,000 striking railroad workers—the largest strike in
America’s history—and Truman proposed legislation (which failed
to pass) to draft striking workers into the Armed Forces. 66
62. See generally American Experience: MacArthur, the Bonus March, PBS,
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/macaeopleevents/pandeAMEX89.html (on file
with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
63. See Irving Bernstein, Chapter 5: Americans in Depression and War, U.S.
DEP’T OF LAB., https://www.dol.gov/general/aboutdol/history/chapter5 (“The
largest of these strikes took place during the fall of 1934 when 376,000 textile
workers in hundreds of mills in New England and the South walked out”) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
64. Arden Williams, Textile Industry, NEW GA. ENCYCLOPEDIA (Oct. 5, 2007),
http://www.georgiaencyclopedia.org/nge/ArticlePrintable.jsp?id=h-2606 (on file
with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
65. Id.
66. American Experience: Truman, PBS, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/
americanexperience/features/general-article/truman-domestic/ (on file with the
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
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B. Mid to Late-20th Century
The year 1957 saw President Eisenhower federalize Arkansas
National Guard troops and send Active Component troops under
Executive Order 10730 67 to Little Rock, Arkansas to counter
desegregation violence in the aftermath of the landmark Brown v.
Topeka Board of Education case in which the United States
Supreme Court ruled that segregated schools were “inherently
unequal” and ordered that public schools be desegregated “with all
deliberate speed.” 68 In 1962, President John F. Kennedy sent
16,000 Federal troops under the XVIII Airborne Corps 69 to
Mississippi to quell the so-called “Ole Miss Riot,” in conjunction
with 123 Deputy Federal Marshals, 316 US Border Patrolmen, and
97 Federal prison guards protecting James Meredith, an AfricanAmerican blocked from registering at the university. 70 The task
force arrested 200 persons, including the arrest for insurrection of
a retired Major General Edwin A. Walker who resigned his
commission after reprimand for political activity. 71 In 1963 and
1965, forces also deployed to Tuscaloosa, Tuskegee, and Selma,
Alabama to counter racial violence as a result of the forced
enrollment of African-American students and civil rights
marches, 72 and in 1967 to Detroit to suppress riots there. 73
The increasing number of domestic disturbances and
anticipated threats to security gave rise in 1965 to the US Army
Intelligence Command (USAINTC), the Army counterintelligence
element conducting operations in the continental United States,
utilizing 300 field and residents offices across the nation organized
into seven Military Intelligence groups. 74 After the August 1965
67. Exec. Order No. 10,730, 22 Fed. Reg. 7628 (Sept. 25, 1957).
68. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
69. SCHEIPS, supra note 20, at 101–35.
70. Exhibit, Clemson University Office of Institutional Research in
conjunction with "Integration with Dignity: A Celebration of 40 Years”, Harvey
Gantt and the Desegregation of Clemson University (Jan. 28, 2003),
http://www.clemson.edu/oirweb1/FB/OIRWebpage/Integration.htm.
71. See Walker v. Pulitzer Pub. Co., 394 F.2d 800 (8th Cir. 1968) (detailing
an interesting perspective on the diversity defamation case instituted by Walker
involving this matter).
72. SCHEIPS, supra note 20, at 159–64.
73. Id. at 177–88.
74. See John P. Finnegan, Army Lineage Series: Military Intelligence, 161–
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Los Angeles Watts rioting, USAINTC provided crisis support and
contingency planning for collecting domestic intelligence under the
STEEP HILL contingency plan to be implemented in the event of
deployment of federal troops. 75 That plan, redesigned GARDEN
PLOT in 1967 (and still extant today) proved to be inadequate with
respect to aiding Army commanders in civil disturbance
situations; 76 thus, subsequent collection plans (e.g., PUNCH
BLOCK, LANTERN SPIKE), with respect to military
counterintelligence collection and analysis, were separate from
any federal or local law enforcement capabilities. 77
The years of 1967 and 1968 were especially significant—and
tragic—with respect to military support to civilian authorities. The
Newark, New Jersey riot response involved elements of the Army’s
108th Military Intelligence Group at Ft. Devens, Massachusetts,
and with the Army largely “limited to observing events, the whole
burden fell upon the police and the National Guard, which reached
a peak strength of 5,367 in Newark on 17 July [1967].” 78 The
Detroit Riots of 1967 involved 5,000 Federal troops and 17,000 law
enforcement officers quelling one of the deadliest and most
destructive riots in US history; reaction to a police raid of an
unlicensed after-hours bar escalated to a loss of 43 lives, 467
injuries, 7,200 arrests, and the destruction of 2,000 buildings. 79
The October 1967 march on the Pentagon was the first national
protest against the Vietnam Conflict, during which 5,000–6,000
armed Army troops deferred to 300 US Deputy Marshals to deal
with 35,000 protesters, and ultimately to arrest 82. 80 Race riots in
110 cities across the United States ensued following the April 4,
1968 assassination of the Reverend Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., 81
63 (1997), https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=437576 (detailing the history of
intelligence within the U.S. army).
75. SCHEIPS, supra note 20, at 161.
76. Id. at 143.
77. Finnegan, supra note 74, at 155.
78. SCHEIPS, supra note 20, at 174.
79. Id. at 177–204.
80. See id. at 231–66 (delineating the so-called “Spring Mobilization to End
the War in Vietnam,” which became the “National Mobilization Committee to End
the War in Vietnam,” was a coalition of antiwar activists formed in 1967 to
organize large demonstrations in opposition to the Vietnam War).
81. Finnegan, supra note 74, at 156.
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most critically affecting Washington D.C.; in the largest federal
occupation on United States soil since the Civil War, the White
House dispatched some 13,600 Federal troops, including the 3rd
Infantry Division (Old Guard), and 1,750 federalized D.C. National
Guard troops to augment civilian law enforcement and quell
disturbances across the capitol city. 82 Rioting spread to Chicago,
Baltimore, and other cities across the nation as the “last of the
great racial disturbances of the 1960s.” 83
On April 13, 1968, Secretary McGiffert took charge of the
Department of Defense Civil Disturbance Steering Committee,
with the US Deputy Attorney General as a member. 84 The
committee’s job was to advise the secretary of the Army in his
capacity as the executive agent in dealing with civil disturbances
or other lawlessness prejudicial to public order—all of which was
soon to be formally authorized by DOD Directive 3025.12, 8 June
1968. 85
The year 1970 saw the peaceful as well as lethal use of military
force to deal with civil disturbance. The Postal Strike of that year
involved over 200,000 workers in over 30 cities, 86 in response to
which President Richard Nixon ordered 18,500 troops into New
York City under the DOD Postal Augmentation Plan, a/k/a
Operation Graphic Hand, ostensibly to sort mail, but with followon efforts of up to 115,000 troops to deploy to 35 cities if the strike
continued. 87 While Graphic Hand troops avoided confrontation, as
did those who responded to the May 1970 New Haven
demonstrations, the Ohio National Guard killed four unarmed
82.
83.
84.
85.

SCHEIPS, supra note 20, at 267.
Id. at 335.
Id. at 342.
The current version of this directive is DOD DIR. 3025.12, MILITARY
ASSISTANCE FOR CIVIL DISTURBANCES (MACDIS) (1994), http://www.au.af.
mil/au/awc/awcgate/ dod/d302512p.txt (on file with the Washington and Lee
Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
86. AMERICAN POSTAL WORKERS UNION, http://www.apwu.org/apwu-history
(on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
87. For more information on Graphic Hand, see Mason R. Schaefer,
Operation Graphic Hand, 1970: The Army Moves the Mail (presented at 2004
Conference of Army Historians, July 13–15, 2004) (copy in Historian’s files at
Center of Military History). For post-strike Graphic Hand activity of the civil
disturbance directorate and its successor, the Directorate of Military Support, see
DCDPO Historical Summary, July 1969–June 1970, and DOMS Historical
Summary, July 1970–June 1971 (cited in SCHEIPS, supra note 20, at 433).
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students, with twenty-eight guardsmen acknowledging having
fired live rounds during the Kent State campus protests. 88
In a matter reflecting a 19th Century incident repeating itself
in the late 20th Century, President Richard M. Nixon sent federal
troops to Wounded Knee, SD in 1973 during a 71-day siege of
properties occupied by American Indian Movement activists, with
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) cordoning off the area
by using US Marshals and later National Guard units. 89
C. The Late 1970s through Early 1990s: Garden Plot Revisited
President Jimmy Carter established the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) under the 1978 Reorganization Plan
No. 3, and activated April 1, 1979, by Executive Order 12127. 90
Executive Order 12148 shifted disaster relief efforts to the new
federal-level agency, and FEMA gained responsibility from DOD
for the nation’s Civil Defense. 91
On September 20, 1989, President George H.W. Bush sent
Active Component and federalized National Guard forces under
Executive Order 12690 92 to St. Croix, US Virgin Islands ostensibly
at the request of the Territorial Governor to quell civil disturbance
and provide disaster assistance to over 50,000 inhabitants after
Hurricane Hugo damaged or destroyed over 90% of the island’s
structures and created a significant number of hazardous oil
88.
89.

SCHEIPS, supra note 20, at 406.
See id. at 434–38 (citing FREDRICK S. CALHOUN, THE LAWMEN: UNITED
STATES MARSHALS AND THEIR DEPUTIES, 1789–1989, 297–301 (1990)). Although
National Guard troops under state control could not legally conduct operations on
the reservation, the state called over 400 guardsmen to active duty to ensure that
the disturbance was confined to the reservation. In addition, the state police
established roadblocks around the disputed area. At peak strength about 350
federal, state, and local law enforcement officers were on the scene. Id.
90. Exec. Order No. 12,127, 44 Fed. Reg. 19,367 (Mar. 31, 1979).
91. See Exec. Order No. 12,148, 44 Fed. Reg. 43,123 (July 20, 1979) (noting
that FEMA absorbed the Federal Insurance Administration, the National Fire
Prevention and Control Administration, the National Weather Service
Community Preparedness Program, the Federal Preparedness Agency of the
General Services Administration, and the Federal Disaster Assistance
Administration activities from HUD) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
92. Exec. Order No. 12,690, 54 Fed. Reg. 39,153 (Sept. 20, 1989).

DEFENSE SUPPORT OF CIVIL AUTHORITIES

111

spills. 93 Under the 1967 Garden Plot contingency plan, Joint Task
Force (JTF) 140 brought together Army, Navy and Coast Guard
elements, with a contingent from the US Marshals Service and the
FBI, for Operation Hawkeye, FEMA’s first major test of disaster
relief capabilities. 94 Military Police, augmented by medical,
engineer, legal and other support personnel enforced a dusk-todawn curfew—but not martial law: they patrolled the island for
two months, securing key installations; worked with the FBI and
the US Marshals to apprehend several hundred escaped prisoners;
intercepted air-dropped bundles of cocaine valued at over $50
million; and carried out extensive training for the Virgin Island
National Guard and conducted joint patrols with the St. Croix
Police Department. 95
Six days in early May 1992 were filled with rioting, arson,
murder and mayhem on the streets of Los Angeles following the
controversial acquitting of officers involved in the Rodney King
beating. 96 Garden Plot yet again became the contingency plan
under which some 10,000 activated California National Guard
troops served alongside 2,500 Active Component troops, and 1,700
federal law-enforcement officers from different agencies from
across the state to put down disturbances.
In August 1992, FEMA’s second major test came as Hurricane
Andrew struck the Florida and Louisiana coasts with 165 mph
winds, making 250,000 people homeless in the affected areas.
Within five days, some 20,000 National Guard and 16,000 XVIII
Airborne Corps troops 97 deployed yet again under the Garden Plot
contingency plan and FEMA’s oversight, and by October, all
disaster relief functions were eventually turned over to civilian
contractors and Corps units returned to Ft. Bragg. 98 In its
93. William Branigin, Hurricane Hugo Haunts Virgin Islands, WASH. POST
at A1 (Oct. 31, 1989), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/national/
longterm/hurricane/archives/hugo89a.htm (on file with the Washington and Lee
Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
94. MICHAEL SULLIVAN, THE NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF
U.S. ARMY MILITARY POLICE 8–12 (1992).
95. Id. See also generally FREDERIC L. BORCH, JUDGE ADVOCATES IN COMBAT—
ARMY LAWYERS IN MILITARY OPERATIONS FROM VIETNAM TO HAITI 276–78 (2001).
96. SCHEIPS, supra note 20, at 441–49.
97. Dale Carroll, Lessons Learned from Hurricane Andrew (Apr. 15, 1996),
http://www.iaff.org/hs/disasterrelief/resources/jointtaskforce.pdf.
98. Id.
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February 1993 report, "Coping with Catastrophe," the National
Academy of Public Administration (NAPA) found that “major
changes were needed—in the White House, in Congress, in FEMA,
in other federal agencies, and in the states and localities.” 99 NAPA
identified several basic paradigms in preparedness for national
security emergencies and domestic civilian emergency
preparedness and response that were causes of the failed response,
and proposed a “comprehensive set of recommendations to address
the causes of the nation’s inadequate response to … catastrophic
events.” 100
D. The Early 2000s Through the 2010s—Putting the National
Response Plan (Framework) To Test
Following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the 2002
Unified Command Plan (UCP) 101 established U.S. Northern
Command (NORTHCOM) to plan, organize and execute homeland
defense and civil support missions—marking the first time these
missions fell under the direction of a single unified command. 102
NORTHCOM’s region of responsibility includes the continental
United States, Alaska, Canada and Mexico, including the Gulf of
Mexico and Straits of Florida as well as water space extending to
approximately 500 nautical miles from the coast. 103 U.S. Army
North/Fifth Army (USARNORTH), at Fort Sam Houston, Texas, is
both the joint forces land component command (JFLCC) and the
Army service component command (ASCC) to NORTHCOM. 104
99. COPING WITH CATASTROPHE—BUILDING AND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
SYSTEM TO MEET PEOPLE’S NEEDS IN NATURAL AND MANMADE DISASTERS, NAT’L
ACAD. OF PUB. ADMIN. (1993), http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/dhs/fema/coping.pdf.
100. Id.
101. News Release No. 188-02, Unified Command Plan (Apr. 17, 2002),
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/unified/ucp17apr.htm (on file with the
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice); Memorandum
from George W. Casey, Jr., Lieutenant Gen. to Chief of Staff, U.S. Army ET. AL.
(with
Change-1
and
Change-2
incorporated)
(Feb.
4,
2003),
http://www.bits.de/NRANEU/others/strategy/UCP-1-2003.pdf.
102. Special Briefing on the 2002 Unified Command Plan, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF.
(Apr. 17, 2002), http://www.fas.org/irp/news/2002/04/dod041702b.html (on file
with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
103. Id.
104. Christine Le Jeune, Consequence Management: Steps in the Right
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USARNORTH’s responsibilities are:
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to

civil

authorities,

• Execute DOD’s homeland defense and civil support operations
in the land domain.
• Further develop, organize and integrate DOD CBRNE response
capabilities and operations.
• Build the capability to perform the Joint Force Land
Component Command and the Army Service Component
Command functions.
• Secure land approaches to the homeland.
• Continue to build a highly competent, disciplined workforce in
a world class organization. 105

USARNORTH appointed Defense Coordinating Officers, to be
assigned to all ten FEMA regional offices, to more effectively
coordinate the availability and employment of DOD resources. 106
Notwithstanding the realignment of FEMA under the new
DHS, and the lessons which should have been learned during
Hurricane Andrew and prior troop deployments, federal and state
response plans were not adequately revised or rehearsed before the
fateful natural disasters to come. Those events were the August–
September 2005 disasters of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, the first
and ninth most costly and devastating Atlantic hurricanes ever
recorded. 107 Within the United States, and as delineated in the
then-extant NRP, disaster response and planning was first and
foremost a local government responsibility. States had the option
of receiving disaster assistance in accordance with numerous interjurisdictional mutual aid agreements, such as the Emergency

Direction?, NAT’L SEC. WATCH (Sept. 8, 2010), https://www.ausa.org/file/
1633/download?token=BT2FKy8w (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal
of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
105. U.S. ARMY NORTH (FIFTH ARMY), http://www.arnorth.army.mil (last
visited Oct. 16, 2016) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights
and Social Justice). CBRNE is the abbreviation for chemical, biological,
radiological, nuclear and high-yield explosive. Id.
106. Le Jeune, supra note 104, at 4.
107. SPECIAL REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND
GOVERNMENTAL
AFFAIRS,
S.
REP.
NO.
109-322
(2006),
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-109srpt322/pdf/CRPT-109srpt322.pdf.
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Management Assistance Compact (EMAC), 108 under which 20,000
civilians and 46,500 Active and National Guard personnel were
deployed to the Gulf Coast region to respond to these disasters. 109
Aside from an estimated $200 billion cleanup cost, 110 the
Inspector General of the DHS said “his office had received
accusations of fraud and waste in the multibillion-dollar relief
programs linked to Hurricane Katrina.” 111 Many agencies,
including the military, sought the opportunity—and resources—to
“get well” and become fully equipped and ready to deploy instantly
in a crisis; for instance, the then-Chief of the National Guard
Bureau testified to a Congressional Committee in September 2005
that $1.3 billion was needed immediately, part of $7 billion for
“radios, trucks, construction machinery, and medical gear” was
needed for the National Guard alone. 112
108.
109.

Id. at 10, 99.
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-854, EMERGENCY
MANAGEMENT ASSISTANCE COMPACT: ENHANCING EMAC’S COLLABORATIVE AND
ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITY SHOULD IMPROVE NATIONAL DISASTER RESPONSE (Aug.
30, 2007), http://www.gao.gov/assets/270/263302.html (on file with the
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
110. Ocean
Facts,
NOAA,
http://oceanservice.noaa.gov/facts/coastal
threat.html (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and
Social Justice).
111. Philip Shenon, Official Vows Investigation of No-Bid Relief Contracts,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 14, 2005), http://nyti.ms/2dJaWkl (on file with the Washington
and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
112. Scott Shane, At Hearings, States and National Guard Make Appeals for
Aid, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 29, 2005), http://nyti.ms/2dJb1oe (on file with the
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). At the hearing:
General Blum said the problem had become acute as Guard units had
deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan, taking the newest equipment with
them and then leaving it there for replacement soldiers to use. That
practice was wise, he said, but left the home front with an outdated
and dwindling supply of gear, at best about 34 percent of what was
needed . . But, he said, the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, and
Hurricane Katrina showed the need for the Guard to be fully equipped
and ready to deploy instantly in a crisis.
Id.
The continued trend towards increased resourcing for the National Guard and
Army Reserve forces included an Army 2017 budget that requests “a near
doubling in the Army funding line that pays for involuntary mobilizations . . .
compared with the amount officials requested in 2016” in order to cope with
“ongoing readiness strains within its active duty force” and a “significant uptick
in its use of National Guard and Army Reserve forces to handle missions in
combatant commands throughout the world.” Jared Serbu, Army wants more
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On September 14, 2007, the DOD’s Joint Staff produced
overarching guidelines and principles to assist commanders and
their staffs in planning, conducting, and assessing DSCA, in the
guise of Joint Publication (JP) 3-28, Civil Support. 113 In February
2013, JP 3-28 was supplemented by a Multi-Service Tactics,
Techniques, And Procedures (MTTP) publication for DSCA and
integrating with national guard civil support, 114 and the 2007
version of JP 3-28 was superseded by, and updated through, the
July 31, 2013 issuance of JP 3-28, Defense Support of Civil
Authorities, which “provides the doctrinal basis for interagency
coordination during DSCA operations.” 115
The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) acknowledged
the increasing importance of DOD in assisting civil authorities and
defending the nation from direct attacks, stating, “when
responding to an event within the United States, the Department
of Defense will almost always be in a supporting role.” 116 To
Guard, Reserve deployments in 2017, FED. NEWS RADIO (Feb. 29, 2016),
http://federalnewsradio.com/army/2016/02/army-wants-guard-reservedeployments-2017/ (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights
and Social Justice).
113. JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUBLICATION (JP) 3-28, CIVIL SUPPORT
(Sept. 14, 2007), http://fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/jp3-28.pdf.
114. ARMY, MARINE CORPS, NAVY, AIR FORCE, DSCA MULTI-SERVICE TACTICS,
TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES FOR DEFENSE SUPPORT OF CIVIL AUTHORITIES AND
INTEGRATING WITH NATIONAL GUARD CIVIL SUPPORT, ATP 3-28.1 (FM 3-28.1)
(MCWP
3-36.2)
(NTTP
3-57.2)
(AFTTP
3-2.67)
(Sept.
2015),
https://fas.org/irp/doddir/army/atp3-28-1.pdf; DEP’T OF ARMY, ARMY DOCTRINE
PUBLICATION (ADP) 3-28, DEF. SUPPORT OF CIVIL AUTH.’S (July 2012),
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/adp/3-28/adp3_28.pdf;
US MARINE CORPS, MARADMINS Active Number: 589/05, USMC ROLES AND
MISSIONS IN HOMELAND DEF. AND DEF. SUPPORT OF CIVIL AUTH.’S (Dec. 13, 2005),
http://www.marines.mil/News/Messages/Messages-Display/Article/894489/usmcroles-and-missions-in-homeland-defense-and-defense-support-of-civil-author/ (on
file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
115. JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUBL’N (JP) 3-28, DEF. SUPPORT OF CIVIL
AUTH’S (July 31, 2013), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_28.pdf.
116. See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW REPORT 19 (Feb.
2010),
http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/features/defenseReviews/QDR/QDR
_as_of_29JAN10_1600.pdf. The DOD states that:
The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) is a legislatively-mandated
review of Department of Defense strategy and priorities. The QDR will
set a long-term course for DOD as it assesses the threats and
challenges that the nation faces and re-balances DOD’s strategies,
capabilities, and forces to address today’s conflicts and tomorrow’s
threats.
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confront these security challenges, DOD, as stated in the 2010
QDR, intended to reorganize its domestic CBRNE consequence
management enterprise, largely toward state National Guard. As
part of this initiative, DOD has been working to create Homeland
Response Forces (HRFs) tailored to deal with CBRNE incidents yet
to come in America’s future. 117
A significant change to the law came on December 31, 2011,
with the amendment of Title 10 (specifically 10 U.S.C. § 12304a)
ordering the Army Reserve, Navy Reserve, Marine Corps Reserve,
and Air Force Reserve to active duty to provide assistance in
response to a major disaster or emergency. When a governor
requests federal assistance in responding to a major disaster or
emergency, the secretary of defense may, without the consent of
the member affected, order any unit and any member of the Army
Reserve, Navy Reserve, Marine Corps Reserve, and Air Force
Reserve to active duty for a continuous period of not more than 120
days to respond to the governor’s request. 118
The revisions that resulted in the NRF were put to the test
during the fall of 2012, when Hurricane Sandy and the northeaster
that swept through the Mid-Atlantic and Northeastern United
Id.
117. Id.; see also Le Jeune, supra note 104, at 4. Christine Le Jeune of the
Institute of Land Warfare, Association of the United States Army (AUSA) noted
that:
Several states have already announced plans for development of HRFs
for each FEMA region: Ohio and Washington will launch units by
October 2011, and California, Georgia, Massachusetts, Missouri, New
York, Pennsylvania, Texas and Utah will follow suit in 2012. Each unit
will focus on planning, training and exercising at the regional level
when not engaged in consequence management operations. If
necessary, HRFs will function alongside other National Guard-sourced
CBRNE consequence management forces that are employed by the
governors. These forces include 57 weapons of mass destruction civil
support teams (WMD-CSTs) and 17 CBRNE enhanced response force
packages (CERFPs), as well as federally-controlled elements such as
defense CBRNE response forces (DCRFs) and two consequence
management command and control elements for follow-on forces.
Current thought within the National Guard Bureau is that this new
construct is more responsive with a better match of lifesaving
capabilities and allows for an improved balance between state and
federal control.
Id.
118. 10 U.S.C. § 12304a (2012).
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States required that the DOD provide emergency temporary power
and pumping capability and to distribute fuel, food, cold-weather
clothing, and other comfort items as requested by civil
authorities. 119 Some 4,000 Active Component NORTHCOM
personnel supported Hurricane Sandy relief operations in the
affected area, alongside 6,618 National Guard personnel from New
York, New Jersey, Connecticut and West Virginia assisting in
response and recovery efforts across their affected states. 120
In May 2013, NORTHCOM coordinated DOD-provided
support to the FEMA and state and local response activities in
response to tornado-devastated areas in Oklahoma. 121 The
command activated the Region VI Defense Coordinating Officer,
and the Defense Coordinating Element to Moore, Oklahoma, to
validate, plan and coordinate potential DOD support of FEMA’s
disaster response operations. It also deployed search-and-rescue
coordinators as part of the Federal Search and Rescue
Coordination Group (FSARCG), and to facilitate DOD’s support of
potential life-saving and response operations. DOD will provide
regional knowledge, requirements validation, and liaison support
to the affected areas. 122
Natural disasters continued during the summer of 2013,
especially in the guise of wildfires. Personnel and equipment from
Colorado-based military installations assisted local, state and
federal authorities in battling the June 2013 Black Forest Fire in
the southern part of the state. 123 Support was provided through
several authorities, NORTHCOM officials said, including mission
assignments, immediate response authority and mutual aid
119. DEP’T OF DEF. OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SEC’Y OF DEF. FOR PUB. AFFAIRS,
News Release No. 879-12, Update on the DOD and National Guard Response to
Hurricane Sandy (Nov. 7, 2012), http://archive.defense.gov/Releases/Release.
aspx?ReleaseID=15665 (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil
Rights and Social Justice).
120. Id.
121. U.S. Northcom Aids Oklahoma Tornado Disaster Relief Efforts, U.S.
DEP’T OF DEF. (May 22, 2013), http://archive.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.
aspx?id=120112 (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and
Social Justice).
122. Id.
123. Military Bases Support Colorado Firefighting Effort, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF.
(June 14, 2013), http://archive.defense.gov/News/newsarticle.aspx?ID=120290
(on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
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agreements. 124 At least 150 Colorado National Guard troops, along
with their equipment, were employed to contain 65% of blazes,
affecting a twenty-two-square-mile area with at least two fatalities
and the destruction of nearly 500 homes, 125 with the mission
complete by June 22, 2013. 126 Arizona National Guardsmen along
with California and North Carolina Air National Guard tankers
and crewmembers joined the response to wildfires that killed
nineteen civilian firefighters in the first week of July 2013. 127
Towards the end of predicting future natural disasters on the
basis of past patterns, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
(NGA– formerly NPIC) began in the fall of 2013 “to create a global
geographic intelligence database that can anticipate future world
trouble spots and humanitarian crises by combining detailed
mapping with information about trends, demographics and
weather patterns in those areas.” 128 The NGA publicly discloses it
is an agency for the Department of Defense that manages and
124. Id.
125. Jecca Geffre, Guard Members Man Colorado Fire Lines on Father’s Day,
U.S. ARMY (June 17, 2013), http://www.army.mil/article/105709/ (on file with the
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
126. Second Regular Session, Sixty-ninth General Assembly, State of
Colorado, Interim Committee Resolution Bill 12, CONCERNING THE COLORADO
NATIONAL GUARD AND, IN CONNECTION THEREWITH, HONORING GUARD MEMBERS
FOR
THEIR FIREFIGHTING EFFORTS (Oct.
25,
2013),
https://www.
colorado.gov/pacific/sites/default/files/13%20WildfireMattersResolution2.pdf.
127. See National Guard Responds to Arizona Wildfires, DEF. MEDIA ACTIVITY
(July 2, 2013), http://www.dvidshub.net/video/295286/national-guard-respondsarizona-wildfires#.UdiPo1OHRmE (noting that Arizona National Guardsmen
were activated to help fight the wildfire) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice); Tony Perry, Two California Air
National Guard Tankers to Fight Arizona Blaze, L.A. TIMES (July 2, 2013),
http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-air-national-guard-tankersarizona-fire-20130702,0,6370548.story (“Two air tankers from the California Air
National Guard are being sent from Colorado to fight the Yarnell Hill blaze in
Arizona . . . .”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and
Social Justice); Charlotte National Guard Team to Fight Wildfires in Arizona,
WSOCTV (July 5, 2013), http://www.wsoctv.com/news/ news/local/charlottenational-guard-team-fight-wildfires-ariz/nYfPs/ (“A Charlotte Air National Guard
team is preparing to battle the Arizona wildfire that took the lives of nineteen elite
firefighters. The 145th Airlift Wing heads out to Arizona on Sunday”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
128. Ray Locker, Military Maps to Focus on Natural Disasters, Analysis, USA
TODAY,
Nov.
19,
2013,
9:45
AM,
http://www.usatoday.com/story/
nation/2013/11/19/nga-geoanalytics-map-natural-disasters/3628911/ (on file with
the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
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provides imagery and geospatial information for diverse military,
civil, and international needs. 129 It further discloses that, amongst
its many missions, it “assists humanitarian and disaster relief
efforts by working directly with the lead federal agencies
responding to fires, floods, earthquakes, landslides, hurricanes or
other natural or manmade disasters.” 130 Such a geospatial
database may prove useful if not indispensable in dealing with
both foreign and domestic natural and man-made disasters.
From April 28 through May 3, 2014, another series of domestic
natural disasters occurred, including deadly severe storms,
tornadoes and flooding; in the aftermath of destruction, National
Guard members worked, “in coordinated efforts with civilian
agencies . . . responding to communities in several states across
the south.” 131
At least 62,000 unaccompanied children from Central America
came across the US-Mexico border from the fall of 2013 up through
the time of this writing, more than twice the number that came the
previous year; they were, in the estimation of NORTHCOM
Commander General Jacoby, fleeing gang activity yet “seeking
legal entry into the U.S.”132 General Jacoby said “the lawlessness
in Central America could spawn ‘hybrid’ organizations that deal in
terrorism, posing a threat to US national security.” 133 In providing
defense support to the Department of Health and Human Services
(HHS), NORTHCOM established a temporary housing facility at
Joint Base San Antonio-Lackland, Texas, for the unaccompanied
129. See
About
NGA,
NAT’L GEOSPACIAL-INTELLIGENCE AGENCY,
https://www.nga.mil/About/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Oct.17, 2016) (noting
that the NGA “is the nation’s primary source of geospatial intelligence . . . for the
Department of Defense and the U.S. Intelligence Community. . . . in support of
U.S. national security and defense, as well as disaster relief”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
130. Id.
131. National Guard Coordinates Storm Response with Civilian Agencies,
U.S. DEP’T OF DEF. (Apr. 29, 2014), http://archive.defense.gov/news/
newsarticle.aspx?id=122145 (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil
Rights and Social Justice).
132. Michael De Yoanna, Top U.S. General Says Border Kids Fleeing Gangs,
CO. PUB. RADIO (Aug. 6, 2014), http://www.cpr.org/news/story/top-us-generalsays-border-kids-fleeing-gangs#sthash.8yvdB79H.dpuf (on file with the
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
133. Id.

120

23 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 89 (2016)

children stopped by US Border Patrol who are now being cared for
by HHS’s Administration for Children and Families (ACF). 134
On July 21, 2014, the rapid influx of those so-called “border
kids” across the Mexico-U.S. border prompted Texas Governor
Rick Perry to controversially deploy 1,000 Title 32 National Guard
troops along the 1,254-mile border as part of the ongoing Operation
Strong Safety. 135 That “multi-agency law enforcement initiative,”
first launched in the fall of 2013, was intended “to address three
public safety issues identified in the region: 1) significant criminal
activity; 2) significant number of commercial vehicles on the
roadways; and 3) unsafe driving practices.” 136 Governor Perry
“guaranteed that the National Guard w[ould] remain on the border
at least for . . . three months, which is the time that the $36 million
in the state budget that can be used to pay for them w[ould]
last.” 137 Prior to that deployment, Lieutenant General (retired) H.
Steven Blum, former Chief of the National Guard Bureau from
2003 to 2009 told the media:
There may be many other organizations that might more
appropriately be called upon. If you’re talking about search and
rescue, maintaining the rule of law or restoring conditions back
to normal after a natural disaster or a catastrophe, the
[National] Guard is superbly suited to that. I’m not so sure that
what we’re dealing with in scope and causation right now would
make it the ideal choice. 138
134. USNORTHCOM Support to Department of Health and Human Services,
U.S. N. COMMAND (May 17, 2014), http://www.northcom.mil/Newsroom/ PressReleases/Article/563951/usnorthcom-support-to-department-of-health-andhuman-services/ (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and
Social Justice).
135. Leigh Ann Caldwell, Perry Sending National Guard Troops to Border,
CNN, http://www.cnn.com/2014/07/21/politics/perry-national-guard-border/ (last
updated July 21, 2014) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil
Rights and Social Justice).
136. Operation Strong Safety Targets Crime, Takes Back Border, TEX. DEP’T
OF PUB. SAFETY
(Oct. 24, 2013), http://www.txdps.state.tx.us/director_
staff/media_and_communications/2013/pr102413.htm
(on
file
with
the
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
137. Wendy Davis Says She May Withdraw Texas National Guard from
Border If Elected Governor, FOX NEWS LATINO (Aug. 8, 2014),
http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/politics/2014/08/07/wendy-davis-questionsdeployment-national-guard-on-southern-border/ (on file with the Washington and
Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
138. Greg Sargent, Sending in the National Guard Isn’t the Answer, WASH.
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The deployment became a political campaign matter as well,
with Democratic Texas gubernatorial candidate Wendy Davis
“question[ing] the deployment of . . . troops on the border with
Mexico to curtail illegal immigration and she promised, if elected,
that she will study withdrawing them.” 139
The previously discussed “1033 program,” coupled with
National Guard deployment in Ferguson, MO, became the subject
of critical media focus in the wake of police response to riots in
August 2014, following the police shooting of crime suspect Mike
Brown. 140 In response to calls for “demilitarization” of the police,
Attorney General Eric H. Holder Jr. said “[a]t a time when we must
seek to rebuild trust between law enforcement and the local
community . . . I am deeply concerned that the deployment of
military equipment and vehicles sends a conflicting message.” 141
On Friday, August 15, 2014, Senate Armed Services Chair Carl
Levin (D-MI) called for a review of the so-called 1033 program. 142
Missouri Democratic Senator Claire McCaskill, the chairman
of the Subcommittee on Financial & Contracting Oversight, also
announced she would lead a hearing on the program, and
introduced on May 7, 2015 the Protecting Communities and Police

POST
(July
15,
2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/plumline/wp/2014/07/15/sending-in-the-national-guard-isnt-the-answer/ (on file with
the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
139. FOX NEWS LATINO, supra note 137.
140. See, e.g., Julie Bosman & Matt Apuzzo, In Wake of Clashes, Calls to
Demilitarize Police, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 14, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014
/08/15/us/ferguson-missouri-in-wake-of-clashes-calls-to-demilitarize-police.html?_r=0
(reporting the spread and increasing use of military gear by police departments,
including Ferguson, and accompanying criticisms) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice); Jason Leopold, Mittens, Not
M4s: What Ferguson Police Really Got from the Pentagon’s 1033 Program, VICE
(Aug. 26, 2014), https://news.vice.com/article/mittens-not-m4s-what-fergusonpolice-really-got-from-the-pentagons-1033-program
(disputing
that
the
equipment worn or used by law enforcement responding to riots in Ferguson was
obtained through the “1033 Program”) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
141. Bosman & Apuzzo, supra note 140.
142. Sahil Kapur, Senate Will Review Military Transfers to Local Police, Key
Senator Says, TALKING POINTS MEMO (Aug. 15 2014, 3:04 PM),
http://talkingpointsmemo.com/livewire/carl-levin-senate-review-military-transfers1033 (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social
Justice).
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Act intended to “reform federal programs that send equipment and
funding to local police departments.” 143
In the fall of 2014, President Obama “ordered a comprehensive
review of the government’s decade-old strategy of outfitting local
police departments with military-grade body armor, mineresistant trucks, silencers and automatic rifles;” the result was the
January 15, 2015 Executive Order 13688 Federal Support for Local
Law Enforcement Equipment Acquisition, and subsequent May
18, 2015, Law Enforcement Working Group Recommendations
Pursuant to Executive Order 13688, directing executive
departments and agencies to better coordinate their efforts to
operate and oversee the provision of controlled equipment and
funds for controlled equipment to law enforcement agencies. 144
Both the Executive Order and ensuing Working Group
Recommendations responded, in no small part, to accountability
problems at the “184 state and local police agencies reportedly
suspended from the 1033 Program for losing weapons or failing to
comply with other stipulations.” 145 Notably, the nationally known
143. See Caroline May, McCaskill Announces Hearing on Police
Militarization, BREITBART (Aug. 22, 2014), http://www.breitbart.com/biggovernment/2014/08/22/mccaskill-announces-hearing-on-police-militarization/
(noting that Senator McCaskill is “the chairman of the Subcommittee on
Financial & Contracting Oversight”) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice); United States Senator Claire
McCaskill, With Protecting Communities And Police Act, McCaskill Aims to
Reform Federal Programs that Send Equipment to Local Police, (May 7, 2015),
http://www.mccaskill.senate.gov/media-center/news-releases/with-protectingcommunities-and-police-act-mccaskill-aims-to-reform-federal-programs-thatsend-equipment-to-local-police (providing commentary on the “Protecting
Communities and Police Act” and the proposed text) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
144. Matt Apuzzo & Michael S. Schmidt, In Washington, Second Thoughts On
Arming Police, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 23, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com
/2014/08/24/us/in-washington-second-thoughts-on-arming-police.html?_r=0 (on file
with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice);
Recommendations Pursuant to Executive Order 13688 Federal Support for Local
HOUSE
(May,
2015),
https://m.white
Law
Enforcement,
WHITE
house.gov/sites/default/files/docs/le_equipment_wg_final_report_final.pd; Exec.
Order No. 12,360, 80 Fed. Reg. 3,451 (Jan. 16, 2015).
145. Megan Cassidy, MCSO missing nine weapons from Pentagon’s 1033
program, AZ CENTRAL (Aug. 27, 2014, 7:44 AM), http://www.
azcentral.com/story/news/local/phoenix/2014/08/26/mcso-weapons-pentagonsuspension-1033/14659089/ (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil
Rights and Social Justice); see also Daniel Rivero & Jorge Rivas, How Did
America’s Police Departments Lose Loads Of Military-Issued Weapons?, FUSION
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sheriff of Maricopa County, Joe Arpaio, admitted on August 26,
2014 that his department had been suspended from the program
and is currently missing nine firearms (“eight .45-caliber pistols
and one M-16 rifle”) issued to the agency out of “200 weapons from
the surplus program.” 146 Some 20 to 22 weapons were unaccounted
for over the years, but roughly half were recovered from retired or
current deputies who, incredibly, had brought them home. 147
Under the “1033 Program,” the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office
amassed an arsenal of “a Hummer, a tank, 90 M-16 rifles, 116 .45caliber pistols, 34 M-14 rifles and three helicopters.” 148
In contrast to media hyperbole regarding the program, the
Public Affairs Officer for the Defense Logistics Agency responsible
for the “1033 Program,” reports on the scope and accountability of
the program that:
It’s important to note that 95 percent of items provided through
the 1033 program are non-tactical—e.g., computers, office
furniture, and tools—making the program a valuable source of
supply for cash-strapped police forces. And requests for tactical
items must be reviewed and approved by a governor-appointed
coordinator in each state before the equipment is released . . . .
The 1033 program database is housed on a Defense Department
public website and citizens can view what their local law
enforcement agencies have acquired from the program at any
time. 149

On August 22, 2014 Missouri Governor Jay Nixon started to
withdraw National Guard forces some five days after being
(Aug. 25, 2014, 2:01 PM), http://fusion.net/leadership/story/americas-policedepartments-lose-loads-military-issued-weapons-984250 (noting “that 184 state
and local police departments have been suspended from the Pentagon’s ‘1033
program’ for missing weapons or failure to comply with other guidelines”) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
146. Cassidy, supra note 145.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. See Susan Lowe, Letter to the Editor, Agency: Most Military Surplus
Items given to Police are ‘Non-tactical’, SYRACUSE.COM (Apr. 26, 2016),
http://www.syracuse.com/opinion/index.ssf/2016/04/defense_department_most_
surplus_items_given_to_police_are_non-tactical_your_lett.html
(explaining
purpose of program in letter written by Public Affairs Officer of the Defense
Logistics Agency) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights
and Social Justice); Govern, Defense Support of Civil Authorities to Natural and
Man-Made Disasters, supra note 47, at 806.
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dispatched to Ferguson to help “quell the unrest;” seven months
later and 825 miles away, another deployment of 2,000-plus
soldiers took place, this time from the Maryland National Guard,
called out on April 28, 2015 to assist State Police efforts to prevent
widespread unrest in Baltimore after the funeral of Freddie Gray
who died while in police custody. 150
IV. The Framework for Future National Response to Disasters
and Emergencies
The second edition of the NRF, updated in May 2013, provides
context for how the whole community works together and how
response efforts under the myriad of documents cited up to this
point relate to all other parts of national preparedness. 151 The NRF
remains the primary instrument for applying Federal capabilities
during disaster response. 152 It is one of the five documents of a set
of National Planning Frameworks, with each covering one
150. Campbell Robertson & Marc Santora, National Guard Troops Begin to
Leave Ferguson, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 22, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/
08/23/us/ferguson-missouri-protests.html?_r=0> (on file with the Washington and
Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice); Kyle Jahner, 2,000 National
Guard Troops Fan Out Across Baltimore, ARMY TIMES (Apr. 28 2015),
http://www.armytimes.com/story/military/guard-reserve/2015/04/28/baltimorenational-guard-mission-freddie-gray-protests/26529499/ (on file with the
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). At the time of
this writing, the New York Times reported:
More than a year after the charges were announced, the prosecution is
set to begin anew with the trial of Officer Edward M. Nero, who was
present for the initial arrest of Mr. Gray. Trials of the remaining four
officers, in addition to a retrial for Officer Porter, will follow on a
schedule that stretches into the fall of 2016. Retrial for Officer Porter,
will follow on a schedule that stretches into the [fall of 2016].
Jess Bidgood, 2nd Officer’s Trial Over Freddie Gray Nears as Baltimore Tries to
Move On, N.Y. TIMES (May 9, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/10/us/2ndofficers-trial-over-freddie-gray-nears-as-baltimore-tries-to-move-on.html (on file
with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice); Jaweed
Kaleem & Matt Pearce, Riots in Milwaukee after Police Shooting: ‘The People are
Fed Up,” L.A. TIMES (Aug. 15, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-namilwaukee-unrest-20160814-snap-story.html (on file with the Washington and Lee
Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
151. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., NAT’L RESPONSE FRAMEWORK, (2d ed., 2013),
https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/20130726-1914-25045-1246/final_national_
response_framework_20130501.pdf.
152. Panetta, supra note 16, at 8.
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preparedness mission area: Prevention, Protection, Mitigation,
Response or Recovery. 153 Replacing the 2008 NRF, which
superseded the corresponding sections of the NRP (2004, with 2006
revisions), it presents the DHS’ guiding principles that “enable the
whole community to work together to prevent, protect against,
mitigate, respond to, and recover from the effects of incidents
regardless of cause, size, location, or complexity.” 154 In its most
current iteration, the NRF establishes a comprehensive, national,
all-hazards approach to domestic incident response. When Federal
military and civilian personnel and resources are authorized to
support civil authorities, command of those forces will remain with
the Secretary of Defense. DOD elements in the incident area of
operations and National Guard forces under the command of a
Governor will coordinate closely with response organizations at all
levels. 155
The government has an inherent emergency power, in
addition to those powers specifically set forth in law, as well as
executive order, and policy. In addition to the Posse Comitatus
Act, The Insurrection Act, and the Stafford Act, Executive Order
12630, provides for governmental actions and interference with
constitutionally protected property rights. 156 Department of
Defense regulations assert another exception that does not rest on
statutory authority, but is available in very limited circumstances
and covers:
Actions that are taken under the inherent right of the U.S.
Government . . . to ensure the preservation of public order and
to carry out governmental operations within its territorial
limits, or otherwise in accordance with applicable law, by force,
if necessary. 157
153. National Planning Frameworks, FEMA, http://www.fema.gov/nationalplanning-frameworks (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil
Rights and Social Justice).
154. Panetta, supra note 16, at 3.
155. See id. (“Dep’t of Def. is a supporting agency for each of the 15 Emergency
Support Functions (ESFs) and each of the 6 Incident Annexes of the National
Response Framework.”). For an explanation of the 15 ESFs, and the 6 Incident
Annexes of the National Response Framework see DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra
note 151.
156. Exec. Order No. 12,360, 53 Fed. Reg. 8,859 (Mar. 15, 1988).
157. See Elsea & Mason, supra note 39, at 3 (citing DEP’T OF DEF. DIRECTIVE
NO. 5525.5, DOD COOPERATION WITH CIVILIAN LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS, ENCL.
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The emergency power, according to DOD directives, is available to
protect Federal property and functions, and to authorize
prompt and vigorous Federal action, including use of military
forces, to prevent loss of life or wanton destruction of property
and to restore governmental functioning and public order when
sudden and unexpected civil disturbances, disaster, or
calamities seriously endanger life and property and disrupt
normal governmental functions to such an extent that duly
constituted local authorities are unable to control the
situation. 158

When employed or deployed after civil disturbances or natural
disasters, federal troops from the DOD would and will receive
direction from FEMA, in accordance with the NRF to work solo or
in concert with other federal agencies to provide personnel,
equipment, supplies, facilities, and managerial, technical, and
advisory services. Support scenarios could include: a Presidential
Declaration of a Major Disaster; 159 an Order to Perform Emergency
Work Essential for the Preservation of Life and Property; 160 and, a
Presidential Declaration of an Emergency. 161
4, 14 (Jan. 15, 1986), http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/d5525_5.pdf).
158. Id.
159. Disaster Declarations, FEMA, http://www.fema.gov/disasters (on file
with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
160. AIR UNIV., FED. RESPONSE PLAN, BASIC PLAN 7 (2003),
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/frp/frpbasic.pdf.
161. See 50 U.S.C. §1621 (2012). This declaration under Congressional
statutory and Article II Constitutional authority provides that:
(a) With respect to Acts of Congress authorizing the exercise, during
the period of a national emergency, of any special or extraordinary
power, the President is authorized to declare such national emergency.
Such proclamation shall immediately be transmitted to the Congress
and published in the Federal Register.
(b) Any provisions of law conferring powers and authorities to be
exercised during a national emergency shall be effective and remain in
effect
(1) only when the President (in accordance with
subsection (a) of this section), specifically declares a
national emergency, and
(2) only in accordance with this chapter. No law enacted
after September 14, 1976, shall supersede this
subchapter unless it does so in specific terms, referring
to this subchapter, and declaring that the new law
supersedes the provisions of this subchapter.
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In all but the instance of a Presidential Declaration of
Emergency, the governor of an affected state or territory must
request assistance regardless of any state or local capacity to
render disaster assistance. 162 The NRF allows DHS to coordinate
federal agencies that work alongside state and local agencies. In
the words of past DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff, these scenarios
do not "supersede the state and local government," but "fit with the
state and local government in a comprehensive response plan." 163
Plans are only useful if reviewed, rehearsed, and effectively
implemented when contingencies arise. Towards that end, the
DHS exhorts that effective preparedness is a critical precondition
for successful response, and encourages a “higher level of
readiness” of “engaged partnerships with elected and appointed
officials, dedicated emergency management practitioners,
nongovernmental organizations, and the private sector, “by
drawing a sharper focus on the value of the following preparedness
activities: planning, organizing, training, equipping, exercising,
and applying lessons learned. 164 For end-users of the NRF,
Id.
In addition to such immediate response authority, military installations may
have concluded mutual aid agreements with local agencies based on precoordinated conditions regarding fire, emergency medical services, hazardous
materials, and public safety, and may also receive requests for assistance via an
action requires form in a mission assignment process. See DEP’T OF DEF.
INSTRUCTION 6055.17, DOD INSTALLATION EMERGENCY MGMT. (IEM) PROGRAM
(Jan.
13,
2009)
(incorporating
Change
1
(Nov.
19,
2010)),
http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/605517p.pdf. With regards to response
for all-hazards incidents, see DEP’T OF DEF. INSTRUCTION 3020.40, DOD POLICY AND
RESPONSIBILITY FOR CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE 14 (Jan. 14, 2010) (incorporating
Change 2 (Sept. 21, 2012)), http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/d3020_40.pdf; DEP’T OF
DEF. INSTRUCTION 3020.45, DEF. CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROGRAM (DCIP) MGMT
(Apr. 21, 2008), http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/302045p.pdf; DEP’T OF
DEF. INSTRUCTION 3020.52, DOD INSTALLATION CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL,
RADIOLOGICAL, NUCLEAR, AND HIGH-YIELD EXPLOSIVE (CBRNE) PREPAREDNESS
STANDARDS (May 18, 2002), http://www.dtic.mil/ whs/directives/corres/pdf/302052p.pdf;
DEP’T OF DEF. INSTRUCTION 6440.03, DOD LAB. NETWORK (DLN) (June 10, 2011)
http://www.dtic.mil/ whs/directives/corres/pdf/644003p.pdf.
162. CSIS & ARNOLD & PORTER LLP, FED. AUTH.’S FOR DISASTER RESPONSE 1
(2005), http://csis.org/files/media/csis/events/051128_rolesauthorities.pdf.
163. Federal Officials Hold News Conference on Katrina Response, CNN (Aug.
15
2005),
Transcript,
http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0508/
31/lol.01.html (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and
Social Justice).
164. FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, NATION RESPONSE FRAMEWORK (NRF)-
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preserving, and protecting private and public assets, the
“[m]astery of these key functions supports unity of effort, and thus
[the] ability to save lives, protect property, and meet basic human
needs.” 165
The future is unpredictable, so in conjunction with state and
federal plans, cities across the United States are taking steps to be
in a better position to respond to disasters. USA Today reported
that many local preparedness plans focus on how to protect critical
infrastructure and how to keep critical systems functioning during
and after a natural and man-made disaster. 166 The Rockefeller
Foundation announced in May 2013 that it would fund “Chief
Resilience Officer” (CRO) positions in 100 cities, on six continents
in 20 countries for five years. 167 In April 2014, San Francisco
became the first city to benefit from a CRO; Patrick Otellini brings
to the CRO role a background in public policy, private sector
dealings with complex planning, building and fire code issues, and
experience as San Francisco’s Director of Earthquake Safety. 168
Chicago became the most recent city, at the time of this writing, to
hire a CRO, formerly the deputy commissioner in the city’s
Department of Water Management since 2012. 169 “CROs will have
FACT SHEET 1 (2014), http://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nrf/NRFOnePageFact
Sheet.pdf.
165. Sarah Twombly, Q & A with The World’s First Chief Resilience Officer,
ROCKEFELLER FOUND. (Apr. 9, 2014), http://www.rockefellerfoundation.org/ blog/qwith-worlds-first-chief-resilience (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of
Civil Rights and Social Justice). By June 4, 2014, the world’s second CRO had
been appointed, outside the U.S. in Medellin, Colombia. See Sarah Twombly,
Introducing Medellin’s Chief Resilience Officer, ROCKEFELLER FOUND. (June 4,
2014),
http://www.rockefellerfoundation.org/blog/introducing-medellins-chiefresilience (expanding on concept of Chief Resilience Officer) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
166. Greg Toppo, Cities Step Up Disaster-Response Planning, USA TODAY
(June 9, 2013, 6:48 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/
2013/06/09/cities-resilience-officer/2373911/ (on file with the Washington and Lee
Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
167. See id. (explaining that CROs will work to ensure cities will “emerge even
stronger from these kinds of shocks and stresses,” Rockefeller president Judith
Rodin further told USA Today, “[W]e can’t predict everything, but we can prepare
for many things and prepare our capacity to rebound more effectively when they
hit.”).
168. Twombly, supra note 165.
169. Nausheen Husain, Data: Eyeing Sustainability, Chicago Hires First
Resilience Officer, CHI. TRIBUNE, May 1, 2016, http://www.chicagotribune.com/
news/plus/ct-graphics-chief-resilience-officer-hired-htmlstory.html (on file with the
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a wide range of duties, including developing a communications
system that can reach anyone during a storm, or a transportation
system to get people to safety in the event of a hurricane or
weather-related disaster.” 170 These CROs will necessarily need to
closely coordinate for DOD support and operate in a complex
interagency-public-private partnership with FEMA, in accordance
with city, state, corporate and NRF guidelines. 171
In a so-called mega-catastrophe, however, when the status of
every state’s stability is uncertain, that willingness to share breaks
down. 172 In cases like these, the resources and competencies of the
DOD will be in great need. 173 In planning for such complex
catastrophes, military leaders at all levels and federal partners
from FEMA met on June 5, 2013 to participate in a one-day
tabletop exercise hosted by USARNORTH to tackle different
complex catastrophe scenarios that comprised the most serious
crises imaginable, in a whole-of-government response to them. 174
The elaborate scenario “started with a massive earthquake
rumbling throughout Southern California [with] cascading effects
that followed included mudslides, broken dams, fires, flooding and
massive property damage, not to mention the potential loss of life,
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
170. U.S. Cities Preparing for Disasters, HOMELAND SEC. NEWS WIRE (June 13,
2013), http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20130613-u-s-cities-preparingfor-disasters (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and
Social Justice).
171. At the time of this writing, Berkeley, California, became the next city to
appoint a Chief Resilience Officer. See Charles Siler, I ‘Chief Resilience Officer,’
BERKELEYSIDE (Aug. 7, 2014, 7:00 AM), http://www.berkeleyside.com/2014/
08/07/berkeley-appoints-first-chief-resilience-officer/
(discussing
Timothy
Burrough’s appointment) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil
Rights and Social Justice). A week after that appointment, Oakland, California,
hired Victoria Salinas as its Chief Resilience Officer. See Will Doig, Oakland Hires
Its First “Chief Resilience Officer,” Publicceo (Aug. 14, 2014),
http://www.publicceo.com/2014/08/oakland-hires-its-first-chief-resilience-officer/
(noting Victoria Salinas’ appointment) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
172. See Paul Stockton, DoD and the Problem of Mega-Catastrophes, in
THREATS AT OUR THRESHOLD HOMELAND DEFENSE AND HOMELAND SECURITY IN THE
NEW CENTURY 21, 30 (Bert Tussing ed., 2007) (explaining that fear and disarray
become widespread during mega catastrophes, creating a demand on the
Department of Defense).
173. Id.
174. DeHart, supra note 12.
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and turned a very bad situation into a worst-case
scenario.” 175Amongst the many lessons re-learned or real-world
experiences validated, the exercise demonstrated that after state
and local authorities had reached their capacity in dealing with
previous disasters, additional federal authorities, such as the
Department of Justice may have to assist local authorities with
response to civil unrest and other challenges. 176 The next such
tabletop exercise will have taken place by June 6, 2016, Cascadia
Rising, anticipating the required response for a magnitude 9.0
earthquake, will take place concurrently with USNORTHCOM’s
Ardent Sentry exercise. 177
The FBI has aptly observed that “[t]here’s no room for
failure—when it comes to weapons of mass destruction, even a
single incident could be catastrophic.” 178 A “second nuclear age” in
which the threat of attack by various weapons of mass destruction
always looms large over the United States and beyond. 179 “In
accordance with direction from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, the Army provides the bulk of the Defense Chemical,
Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Response Force for Fiscal
Year [FY] 2013 and beyond.” 180 According to the National Guard
Posture Statement, some “97% of America lives within a five-hour
response of a National Guard Homeland Response Force or
Chemical, Biological Radiological, Nuclear (CBRN) Enhanced
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Eric Holdeman, Cascadia Subduction Zone Exercise 2016: Cascadia
Rising, EMERGENCY MGMT. (June 15, 2014), http://www.emergencymgmt.com/
emergency-blogs/disaster-zone/cszexercise2016cascadiarising.html (on file with
the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
178. 2scottmontgomery, FBI.gov: WMD Directorate Created July, 2006,
BLOGSPOT (July 26, 2011, 12:43 PM), http://2scottmontgomery.blogspot.com/
2011/07/fbigovwmd-directorate-created-july-2006.html (on file with the
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
179. See, e.g., Paul Bracken, Biological Weapons as a Strategic Threat, 116
PUB. HEALTH REP. (Supp. 2) 5–8 (2001) (“[W]e’re seeing a spread of weapons of
mass destruction and what I call the second nuclear age.”). See generally Kevin
H. Govern. Agroterrorism and Ecoterrorism: A Survey of Indo-American
Approaches Under Law and Policy to Prevent and Defend Against the Potential
Threats Ahead, 10 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 223 (2009).
180. NAT’L GUARD BUR., NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVE EQUIPMENT REPORT
FOR FISCAL YEAR 2013 2–5 (2013), http://palazzo.house.gov/uploadedfiles/ngr%20
equipment%20report%20fy2014.pdf.
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Response Force Package.” 181 If weapons of mass destruction are
ever used on U.S. soil, the Army Reserve’s consequence
management capabilities, in particular, will prove indispensable
in providing mission-ready soldiers and equipment to augment
civilian law enforcement and other first-responder capabilities. 182
Towards that end of readiness, “[s]pecialized units like the
National Guard’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support
Teams conducted 1,720 response, standby, and assist missions in
FY12.” 183
Former Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta warned the nation
in fall 2012 of a potential coming “cyber Pearl Harbor; an attack
that would cause physical destruction and the loss of life . . . [that]
would paralyze and shock the nation and create a new, profound
sense of vulnerability.” 184 Beyond the realms of four-dimensional
operations on land, in and below the seas, and in the air and space,
is a so-called “fifth domain” 185 or “fifth dimension” of warfare” in
which civilian law enforcement may have little to no capacity to
discern cybercrime activity from cyberwarfare. 186 In an era where
181. NAT’L GUARD BUR., 2014 NATIONAL GUARD POSTURE STATEMENT
SUSTAINING AN OPERATIONAL FORCE 9 (2014), http://www.nationalguard.
mil/portals/31/Documents/PostureStatements/2014%20National%20Guard%20
Bureau%20Posture%20Statement.pdf.
182. NAT’L GUARD BUR., NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVE EQUIPMENT REPORT
FOR FISCAL YEAR 2013 supra note 180, at 2–5 (“The Army provides specific
capabilities for Federal military assistance to civilian agencies in the event of an
attack against the United States . . . . These capabilities come from all Army
components in support of Northern Command’s (NORTHCOM’s) mission to
support civil authorities in the event of a disaster.”).
183. NAT’L GUARD BUR., 2014 NATIONAL GUARD POSTURE STATEMENT, supra
note 181, at 27. Towards that end, “Lifesaving Capabilities” include: 10 Homeland
Response Forces, totaling 5,660 Guard members, 17 Chemical, Biological,
Radiological, Nuclear (CBRN) Enhanced Response Force Packages, called
CERFPs, totaling 3,332 Guard members, 57 Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil
Support Teams (WMD-CSTs), each with 22 full-time National Guard members,
conducted in excess of 1,720 response, standby, and assist missions in FY12.
184. Remarks by Secretary Panetta on Cybersecurity to the Business
Executives for National Security, New York City, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF. (Oct. 11,
2012), http://archive.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=5136
(on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
185. War in the Fifth Domain, ECONOMIST, (July 1, 2010),
http://www.economist.com/node/16478792 (on file with the Washington and Lee
Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
186. Fighting in the Fifth Dimension, AL JAZEERA WORLD, (Feb. 19, 2012),
http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/aljazeeraworld/2011/10/20111019169394
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the keyboard and mouse have become weapons of conflict as
well as tools for peace, DOD will continue to use its significant
capability and expertise in support of a whole-of-government
approach to protect the Nation. 187 The policy and legal
authorities governing DOD’s domestic activities—such as
Defense Support to Civil Authorities—extend to cyber
operations, as they would in any other domain. 188 “DOD will
continue to work closely with its interagency partners,
including the Departments of Justice and Homeland Security,
to address threats to the United States from wherever they
originate.” 189
V. Conclusion
Past is certain to be prologue when it comes to both causes
and effects of natural and man-made disasters. As thenLieutenant Colonel Michael L. Sullivan, one of Operation
Hawkeye’s key Military Police commanders noted in the
aftermath of disaster assistance and civil disturbance
operations post-Hurricane Hugo, military forces have
tremendous capabilities to “restore public order and essential
services following a natural disaster, to train local law
enforcement personnel to improve services, and to operate in a
complex cultural and political setting.” 190 Still, in keeping with
the Nation’s great traditions of our military forces being
subject to civilian control, Lt. Gen. Perry Wiggins, commanding
general, USARNORTH has noted that:
In 99 percent of the cases [in providing support to civil
authorities], the DoD will be supporting another principal
fellow agency in the response . . . and that’s important to
understand in the difference of operating in the homeland.
In the homeland, the strength of our nation resides in our
02528.html (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and
Social Justice).
187. DEP’T OF DEF., CYBERSPACE POLICY REPORT: A REPORT TO CONGRESS
PURSUANT TO THE NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2011,
Section 934, at 2 (2011).
188. Id. at 1.
189. Id.
190. SULLIVAN, supra note 94, at 36.
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ability to respond at all levels—local, state and federal. It’s
that synergy that creates the solution to the things in the
homeland that challenge us in addressing our threats. 191

The day after the tragic Boston Marathon bombings, Secretary
of Defense Chuck Hagel pledged to provide any support from
DOD that law enforcement agencies deem necessary as they
investigated “this cruel act of terror,” 192 and Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff Martin Dempsey told Members of
Congress that DOD officials were in “constant contact with
state and federal agencies.” 193 Consistent with this
preparedness, the NORTHCOM Commander has testified
before Congress that,
The commands’ approach is to defend the homeland
“forward” and in-depth through trusted partnerships with
fellow combatant commands, our hemispheric neighbors,
and the interagency community. We carry out our primary
missions of homeland defense, security cooperation, and
civil support with a focus on preparation, partnerships, and
vigilance. 194

The 209-year history of the Insurrection Act, the 138-year-old
Posse Comitatus Act, and other current and future laws,
executive orders, defense policies, and regulations will
continue to strictly delineate the limits to the military’s role in
cooperating with civil authorities when future domestic
disasters strike, and the prescriptions and proscriptions on

191. Christopher DeHart, Army North CG Leads Panel on North American
Security, Missions at AUSA Conference, U.S. ARMY (Nov. 4, 2013),
https://www.army.mil/article/115077/army_north_cg_leads_panel_on_north_ame
rican_security_missions_at_ausa_conference (on file with the Washington and
Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
192. Jim Garamone, Armed Forces Press Service, DOD News: Hagel Says
DOD Will Provide Support After Cruel Act of Terror, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF. (Apr. 16,
2013), http://archive.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=119782 (on file with
the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
193. Id.
194. NORAD and U.S. Command Posture Statement Before the H. Armed
Services Comm., 113th Cong. 4 (2014), http://www.northcom.mil/Portals/28/
Documents/2014%20NC%20Posture%20Statement_Final_HASC.pdf (statement
of General Charles H. Jacoby, Jr., United States Army, Commander, United
States Northern Command and North American Aerospace Defense Command).
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providing military equipment and training to civilian law
enforcement, if not limits on so-called police militarization. 195

195. For an excellent yet brief commentary on the role of the military in
dealing with international natural and man-made disasters, see ELIZABETH
FERRIS, AUSTRALIAN CIVIL-MILITARY CENTRE, FUTURE DIRECTIONS IN CIVILMILITARY RESPONSES TO NATURAL DISASTERS 1–10 (2012), https://www.
brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/05-civ-mil-disasters-ferris.pdf. Ferris
notes that “[o]ver the last ten years natural disasters affected more than 2.4
billion people—the equivalent of one-third of the earth’s population—and they
have wrought over $910 billion in damages—equivalent to approximately 18
percent of global GDP.” Id. at 3–6. Ferris also makes five observations regarding
civil-military relations in international natural disaster response:
(1) The military will increasingly be called to respond to sudden-onset
natural disasters, both at home and abroad.
(2) Generally there are fewer political tensions in civil-military
relations at times of natural disaster compared with in conflict
settings.
(3) International actors, military or civilian, simply are not—and
perhaps cannot be—fast enough in immediate response.
(4) In the three phases of disaster management - prevention, response
and recovery - the military’s role is most needed and accepted in the
response phase and least in the recovery phase.
(5) The military generally has more experience in preparedness
activities hence an importance area of preparedness concerns
developing more effective civil-military coordination mechanisms.
Id.

